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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS'

GENDER DISCRIMINATION
IN 'THE

MEDICAL COMMUNITY
By Andrea K. Scott, J.D., M.A.
Executive Director, Bioethitech Institute
Consultant in Regulatory Affairs, Marketing and Biomedical
The subject of gender discrimination i~ a sensitive OI)e.
Attitudes in .the medical community mirror those found ,in
society at large. Similarly, legal opinions tend to reflect .the
prejudices of the day. Fbrexample, the case of Bradwellv. The
State! reveals the views of the late nineteenth century Unite<:i
States Supreme Court regarding gender: "the civil law, as '
well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide differ'e nce in the respective spheres and destinies of ,man and
woman: , Man is, or should be, woman's protector and de- fender. The natural andproper timidity anddeli(acy which belongs
to thefemale sex evidently unfits itformany ' ofthe occupations ofcivil
life.... [T} he paramount destiny and mission ofwoman are to fulfill .
the noble and benign offices ofwife and mother. This is the law ofthe
. Creator." ,
'
Bradwell v. The State dealt with the petition of Mrs. Myra
Bradwell to the UnitedStates Supreme Court for a license to
practice law in Illinois. Relying upon the 14th Amendment
to 'the Unit,e d States Constitution, to the effect that~ "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities,of citizens inthe several States," Mrs. Bradwell
~rgued that because she was a citizen, she should be entitled
to practice law, just as aay .man would be. The Supreme
Court denied her petition.
, . During the one hundred twenty-three years since Mrs.
Bradwell was forbidden entry to the legalprofess~on, women
have made enormous strides in battling 1 as well as tactfully
jrcumven'ting, discrimination in the medical community.
This progress notwithstanding, I would like to draw your
attention to specific cases of discrimination against women in

E~hics

the professional world: Women as medical students, physicians, scientists 'and patients. ,

Discrimination Against Women Medical Studerits:
The Lipsett Case
,
Dr. Annabelle Lipsettwas a surgery intern in the University
of Puerto Rico General Surgery Residency Training Program
from 1981 through 1983. 2 She brought suit against the ,
University's School of Medicine and several of its offid~rs,
claiming that while she was attend~ng the training program,
, she, was subjected to sexual discrimination in violation of
Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause of 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 and Title IX.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precludes em, ployment discrimination ori the basis of race,color, religion,
sex or national origin. 3 Section 1983" known as the "Equal
Protection Clause," provides for civil actions based on the
deprivation of rights by any "perso,n" acti'n g under the color .
of state law, custom or usage. Discrimination 9n the basis of ;
sex violates the Equal Protection Clause if it "does not serve
important governmental objectives" and is not "substantially
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related to achievement of those objectives." To prove a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted with discriminatory inient. 4
Similarly, Title IX provides that "no person in the United )
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be'denied the benefit~ of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
Specifically, Dr. Lipsett alleged that she was sexually
harassed while she was an intern in the surgery program and
was not promoted to the fourth year residency level of the five
year Surgery Program because of her gender. The key targets
of Dr. Lipsett's legal action Wyre medical resic;i ents who were
s.e veral years ahead of her inthe surgery program and who by
explicit directive of the rules of the program, acted as Or.
Lipsett's supervisors.s .Itis not necessary to discuss any of the
sexually der'ogatory comments and actions of which defendants were found guilty. Suffice it to <say th ~lt the acts of
sexual harassment and sexual ,discrimination w:ere crude,
blatant and endemic t.o the program.
,
, 'Since 1976, when a Federal court first held that sexual
harassment was a form of sex discrimination actionable under /'
Title VII,6 courts throughout the United States have recognized that such ,harassment can take place in two related '.
ways. The first form of hara's sment is know as quid pro quo
harassment, which occurs when a supervisor conditions the
granting of an economic or other job benefit upon thereceipt
of sexual favors from a subordinate or punishes that subordinate for. refusing ~o comply;7
The second form of sexual harassment is called "hostqe
' environment"
harassment" which
occurs when one or
more
,
,
.
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supervisors or co-workers create an atmosphere so infused
with hostility toward Qlembers of one sex that they alter the
conditions of employment for them. 8 . The Lipsett Court de':
scribes hostile environment harassment as follows: ' "Ines- (
sence, by creating a hostile environmynt, '[the employers]
force a man or woman [to] run a gauntlet of sexual abuse' in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make 'a
living."9 Naturally, not all conduct that may be characterized
as "harassment" is viewed.by the law as rising to the level of
an actionable claim; th,e harassment must be "'s ufficiently
severe or pervasive [as] to ... create an abusive working environment."l0
'
It is difficult to determine whose perspective-that 6fthe
harasser or that of the' victim-should be relied upon wpen a
court assesses the issue of harassment and thus, whether or
not the harasser's attentions were unwelcome by the alleged
victim. This is' a particularly thorny issue because in many
instances, a determination of sexual harassment turns on
whether it is found that the plaintiff misconstrued or overre,acted to what the defendant' claims were innocent or invited
overtures. My personal opinion echoes the First Circuit,
which has-written that, "unless the fact finder keeps both the
man's and the woman's perspective in mind, defendants 'as
well as the courts will be permitted to sustain ingrained
notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders." 11
In the Lipsettcase,primaJacieevidence existed upori which
the Court ~readily made a finding of discrimination. When
,direct evidence of discriminatory Intent is lacking 1 howeyer,
a plaintiff may prevail if she' can show by a preponde~ance off
, the evidence that (1) she 'is in a class protected by Title VII'
(such as women or racial or religious minorities); (2) she was
performing her job at a level that met the employer's legiti- '
mate expectation; (3) she was fired in spite of her acceptable
performance; and (4) the employer sought someone to '
perform the same work after she left her position. 12
The hext crucial issue is liability of the edlJcational
. institution and its supervisors, ' in tbis case the physicians
. overseeing the surgery program. In a Title IX legal action, an
educational institution is .liable upon 'a finding of hostile "
environment sexual harassment perpetrated by its supervi,sors upon employees if an official representing that institution kn'ew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, of the harassment's occurance, unless that official can
show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt i~~.13 The
,Lipsett Co~rt further held' that this standard also appqes to
situations in which the hostile environment harassment is
perpetrated by a plaintiffs co~workers.14 This type of abuse
of pow~r ' forms the essence of sexual discrimination: exploitation of a power relationship. IS ,
A final caveat: Under the quid pro quo sexual harass~ent
standa'rd, an educational institution is absolutely liable for
such discriminato'ry acts whether or not it knew, should have
known, or approved of the supervisors\lctions. 16 In the case
of the doctors in the Lipsett action, their supervisory ehc~ur
agement and condonation of, or acquiescence in '~the resi\
dents' discriminatOry behavior created absolute quidpro quo
liability on the part of the University." 17
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. Discrimination Against Women as Physicians: .
The Case of Dr. Frances Conley
Ifwe take Dr. Annabelle Lipsett's harrowing exp~riences
,1 her residency program and add two decades of medical
practice, we emerge with a picture of Dr. Frances Conley, .
who after sixteen years as a professor of neurosurgery at
Stanford University Medical School, resigned abruptly, charging "gender insensitivity" and sexual harassment on the part
of her male colleagues. Dr. Conley did not initiate a lawsuit
against Stanford. She hadno need to do so. Her stature as one
of the first and finest women brain surgeons in the country
garnered widespread publicity at her resignation.' Not surprisingly, ,Dr. Conley was able to accomplish .far more by
returning to and working within the system after leaving it
briefly than young Dr. Lipsett, a'student, was able to accomplish for her female colleagues by prosecuting and winning a
legal action against her university.
During her tenure at Stanford, Dr. Conley repeatedly
tolerated what she referred to as pervasive, subtle discrimination, demeaning ,treatment, inappropriate comments and sexual
a,dvances by her male colleagues. 18 ·
Dr. ' ~onley's male counterparts
used demeaning sexist language
in addressing her in the operating
room, propositioned her to sleep
with them and'made inappropriate
physical adv'ances on her person in professional settings.
'Vhat, then, did Dr. Conley recommend Stanford and all
"'ther uriiversities do?
'
Dr. Conley suggeste,d that medical schools need to raise
the level of consciousness about this type ofbeh~lVior in order
toer().dicate it. She recommended that appointments to executive positions at qniversities be made with great care as to
how the a2pointees relate both to women and minorities as
well as support staff. As she put it, the university and medical
environment mpst be one in which "people are respected for
being people-where ev~ry person has self worth and dig- .
nity."19 _.'
.
When 'a sked why she tolerated this kind of sexually
harassing treatment for almost twenty-five years, Dr. Conley
, responded that, "in order for a female to get taken into the
club, which is necessary in order to get cases and to get
trained, you have to become a member.... Had I m'a de an issue
of some of the things that were happening during the dme
that I wa's a resident, I wouldn't have gotten to where lam
[today]."2o
'
If we broaden our focus by asking if we can make any
generalizations about the experiences ~of Annabelle Lipsett
and Frances Conley, the answer is "yes:." In a national study
conduoted under government auspices in 1993, 73% of female residents reported being sexually harassed, primarily by
male physicians. Perhaps inore surp~ising are the results from
'1 New Engktnd lournal'of Medicine study, which found that
7% of the women doctors surveyed had been sexually
harassed, primarily by male patients. A similar study during'
the springof1993 by Dr. Susan Phillips of Que ens University '

in Ontario and psychologist Margaret Schneider of the Ontario Institute for Studies and Education found more than
three quarters of the women physicians responding said they
had been sexually harassed by male patients. 21 Clearly,
female physicians encounter discrimination--":'both' blatant
and subtle-from their peers as well as patients . .

Discrimination Against Women as Scientists:
Dr. Margaret Jensvold v.Donna Shalala
An interesting trial took place early in 1994which focused
on sexual harassment, sexual discril1!.ination and retafiatory
conduct at the National Institute of Mental Health(NIMH),
a division of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the
DepartmenrofHealth and Human Services (DHHS). In this
legal action, Dr. Margaret ' Jensvold, a psychiatrist, was a
medical staff fellow at the NIMH. Her research focused on
premenstrual syndrome and new ways to treat depression in
women. In her .legal action, Dr. Jensvold alleged . a male
superior harassed her because she was female and flredher in
1989 before she could complete
the third year of a fellowship
program. She left the institute
, amidst what she called an atmosphere of derogatory comments
about herself and other female
profess'ionals, as well as jokes
. and sexualized pictures .of
women. Not surprisingly, Dr. Jensvoldallegedthat she was
. denied opportunities for research .and writing provided to
male medical fellows and was, continually told how ·her
female predecessors had not deserved credit for the work
they had done and were "pushed out" of the Institute
because they could not get along with their male colleagues . .
Once again, one must ask if the case of Margaret J ensvold
is unique or if it represents a'more pervasive problem. As
statistics c~early reveal, the answer is that gender bias in the
scientific commu.nity is ubiquitous. For example, thy Gen:eral Accounting Office (GAO), Congress' investigative arm,
issued a study in June, 1990 which revealed that the NIH had
not included women sufficiently as research subjects and had
experienced minimal success with its four year initiative to
include more women in government research concerning
diseases and their treatments. During 1993, ,the NIH Task
Force on Intramural Women Scientists concluded in its
report that "gross inequities exist in pay, tenure, promotion, and.visibility" as compared to male scientists at NIH.22 The .
kinds of discrimination discussed thus far, h~wever, apply to
a relatively sf!1all group of women because they concern only
those who enter highly competitive professions. More shocking is the gender discrimination women face as medical
patients. No longer are we speaking of a discreet group of
, intellectuals: but are referring to 52% of tbe American public.

73%, offemale residents reported
'bei,!g sexually,harassed,
prim(lrily by male physicif!ns
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Discrimination Against Women as Patients
Although doctors 'are no more inclined to e~hibit gender
bias on the job than any other group of professionals, physiSee Discrimination, page 6 '
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RESPONSES TO THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
('

ON THE USE OF

ANENCEPHALIC NEONATES AS ORGAN DONORS
MAINTAIN THE "DEAD DONOR RULE"
Robert D. Orr, M.D.
Director of Cli~ical Ethics
Lorna Linda University Medical Center
Some rules are so importa~t they should never be broken.
The "dead donor rule" is one of them. Since the beginning of
organ transplantation there has been an unwritten, but inviolate rule that organs will not be removed from an individual
before death; not even if the family of the "donor" requests it;
not even if the donor requests it. The reason for this rigid rule
is that human life has intrinsic value" and respect for the
dignity of each life is a natural component of the. human
condition. Killing one individual for the benefit of another has
never been acceptable.
The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA)
recently announced that iri June 1994 it changed its mind. In
1988 it had reaffirmed the importance of the dead donor rule
'and clearly stated that organs should not be retrieved f~om a
child born with anencephaly before the c'hild met standard
criteria for death. It now believes that "it is .ethically acceptable to transplant the organs of anencepha_Iic neonates even
before the neonates die." It proposes this as a "limited exception to the general standard because of the fact that the infant
has never experienced, and will never experience, consciousness." The CEJA statem~nt claims "a compelling social inter- .
est." What has changed from 1988? Is there n'ew physiologic
in"formation or a new method of moral reasoning?
CEJA attempts to dispel concerns about accuracy of diagnosis, slippery slope concerns (future use of organs from living
demented or permanently unconscious patients, etc.), and
preservation of public trust in the organ procurement system:
: Their arguments are the same as were available in 1988 and ar~
still not pers~asive. However, its most flawed argument is
when it tries to justify breaking the dead donor rule which it
agree,s ·is a "critical principle" which must be "vigorously
maintained." It states that the purposes/of this rule are to (1 >. protect the interests of persons from whom organs are taken;
(2) provide re'assurance to otherindividtials, and (3) preserve
the val~e of respect for life. 'It claims tpat infants born with
anencephaly have .rio interests. It claims that persons with
consciousness will not have to worry about having their organs
removed before death because they can never become anencephalic.1t paradoxically claims that "respect for the esse~tial
worth of life is an absolute value in the sense that it exists
irrespective of a person's quality of life. However, it is not an
absol u te val ue in the sense of overriding all other val ues." Now
'wait just a minute! Is it absolute, or is it r~lative? Perhaps this
is a new (and confusing) method of moral reasoning after all!
The final affront to logic is when CEJA states "the primary
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argument in "favor of permitting parental donation is an argument based on the value of respect for life." _
The CEJA has no new information, no new arguments; just
a convoluted and illogical attempt to justify breaking a rule
against the absolut~ value of human life irrespective of its
quality. The dead donor rule should not be broken.

STAIRWAY TO HELL
Earl Aagaard, Ph.D.
Professor of Biology
Pacific Union College
In,i988,the AMA Council ~m Ethical and Judicial Affairs
. affirmed that even profoundly damaged humans have a right
to be affirmed as ends, and not means; at least after their birth . .
N ow, in 1995, the Council recommends we abandon that bit of
wisdom, and add newborn anencephalic babies to the list of
those who will not be so protected.
Since this decision is.notbased on an absolute, such as the
san~tity of all human Jife, it can offer us no logical stopping '
piace. The current reassurance that less s~verely damaged
children and those in persistent vegetative states will not b
used as organ donors does not represent stability. Whenevel
the majority view among "experts in m.e dicine and ethics"
changes, and the need for organs overcomes our sq ueamishness,
the AMA Council will again want to be consistent, and the list
. will grow. Who will be next? ' Qondemned prisoners? The
severely retarded? We can orily wait and see.
The Council is eager to assure us that this is not a "slippery
slope" situation, a'n d in this they are correct. A slippery slope
implies a lack of control; a sudden, unplanned, and accidental
descent. Plainly that is not what is going on. What we are
, seeing is a careful, step by step descent pown a long s,tairway.
,We can, if we choose, Stop and examine our surroundings,
including where we have been and the destination toward
which we journey. And what awaits us in 't he abyss is exactly
. what has awaited every society tbat divides the human species '
into "protectable" and "not protectable" qltegories. What
awaits us is a world in which the strong prey upon the weak,
usin'g the bodies of the powerless for any purpose cons'iciered
sufficiently important by those with the power to impose their
will.
, Will we learn from history, or insist on reyeating it here in
the "land of the,free"? Surely the last fifty years have made it
abundantly clear thattaking delib<:(rate, conscious steps down
our stairway is not fundamentally differerit from sliding down
the slippery slope. Oh yes, the trip is a little more pleasant, 3"
we soothe ourselves with sophistic reasoning about caiingan
altruism. But the only real difference is that it will take a little
longer to find ourselves in Hell.
J.

r
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LET PARENTS CHOOSE
James Walters, Ph.D.
Professor of-Ethics
Lorna Linda University

,

Quite unchara~teristically, the normally staid:American
Medical Association boldly leads the debate on,anencephalic
neonates as organ sources. Notice ,of the AMA's positive
position made t~e front page of the New York Times. That
paper quoted critic George Annas, a noted health attorney at
Boston University, who labelS the idea "horrendous," citing
anencephalics as "livehuman beings."
, Ye,s, anencephalic newborns are "alive" under current '
law, but that is 'precisely the issue. Should the current
,"whole-brain death" standard be applied to anencephalics?
The AMA argues that anencephalic newborns should be
'exceptions to current law, thus allowing procurement of
"organs from anencephalic n~onatesbefore the neonates
die."
' I am in essential sympathy with' the AMA's position for
reasons cited il) the report and for reasons I have argued
elsewhere. However, ' I object to talk of taking vital organs
from live humans and thus killing them. The "dead donor"
rule is a good one and it need not be sacrificed to accomplish
the AMA report's laudable goals:
I propose that we allow parents' to choose 'among circumscribed options. Because society is so divided over the
moral statu~ of anencephalic infants, parent~ should be able to
, choose among three definitions of death for their anence)halic newborn:-(a), cardio-respiratory death, (1;» whole brain
death, or (c) higher brain dead).Who would choose which option? For example, some
orthodox Jews may opt for cardiorespiratory death (a' legal '
alternative currently available in New Jersey). Most parents
would ,likely accept society's current ' definition of death, '
whole brain death, as applicable to their newborn. Other
, parents,whp viewpossessi~n of higher brain function as that
which bestows upon individu<:tls unique moral status, would
choose cerebral death and thereby make direct organ donationpossible.
The circurnscribedoptions approach requires certain
restrictions because parental autonomy is not and should '
never be absolute. The essential parameters of this third
alternative concern present and potential cerebral functioning: only anencephalic or other newborns that are equally and
absolutelydevoi~ of the, possibility,of cerebral life are 'candi- ,
dates. Put in other words, no infant that has any possibility of
attaining higher brain function could allowably be defined as
dead. There are several reasons supporting the circumscribed
option approach:
"
, • Parents alrdtdy make vital decisions in regard to their
offspring in deciding for or against abortion-within legally
delineated .limits. If the possibility of making such a decision
in ,'regard to ' heal~hy fetuses is permissible, it should be ,
1)ermissible for parents of higher brain-absent newborns to
yiew their tragic newborns as legally dead. ,
• The basis for deciding the use or nonuse of an anen- '
cephalic newborn's organs is rooted in "deep" philosophy,
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yea, religion. This transplant dilemma has been created by
modern medical science, and in this uncharted territory a
, certain morality will hold,sway; even if by default. In areas of
such fundamental personal dispute, it is proper in this land 'o f
civil arid religious libeJty to allow parents to make decisions "
within reasonable limits.
• There are hundreds of infants who are ill or dying and
potentially could be benefited. Consider only the need for
neonatal hearts. Each year in the United States several hun-:dred infants, are born afflicted with hypoplastic left-heart
syndrome, a universally fatal condition until late successes in
infant heart surgery, particularly in neonatal heart transplan,',
"
tation.
Finally, a decision to donate the organs of one's anencephalic newborn is a most personal decision arrived at through
deeply conflicted emotions. There is mounting evidence that
many parents want great good for another couple and their
baby to come from their own personal trauma. Nothing can
take away the despair of the parents of an anencephalic
newborn, but neonatal transplantation now makes possible a
partial win-win situation out of what has alw~ys been a total
lose-lose tragedy.
Allowing parents 'to choose among ci;cumscribed options may appear to , some as too aggressive-even permissive-a step. Such a ' perception is unwarranted when one
realizes that modern medicine is literally forcing an increasingly heterogeneous society to go back to its ~various fund;;tmental views of life and death inrespons'e. But then medical
progress has long forced society to rethink its ideas ,oflife and
death. '
(This piece is based on ~ section of Walters ' forthcoming
What IsA PersonP Brain Function and Mora! Status, University _
of Illinois Press.)

REVISITING THE ISSUES
Steven R.Gundry, M.D. '
Professor of Surgery ,
Lorna Linda -U piversity , :"
"
The complete rever~alof.the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the 'American Medical Association's previous position has captured the news media's interest and has
renewed the debate regarding anencephalic infants and their ,
outcome. Unlike in 1988, important ne~ considerations exist
that make the reversal of the Council's position perhaps more
understandable. :
Since the transplantation of a neonatal heart in Baby
Moses in November 1985 by Dr. Leonard Bailey, hundreds of
infants have now received hearts,lungs, kicineys or livers to
'correct otherwise Ieth~l organ dysfunction. \yhat started out
, ten years ag9 as experiinentation has now been acc~pted as '
proper and effective long ' term therapy. Consequently, as
organ transplantation has ,been applied to more and more
infants, the availability of organs fQl' these r<:?cipients has
diminished, with the result that hundreds of children die each
year from cardiac; hepatic or renal fail ure. N umerous rheth~ds
have been tried in recent years to improve the' availability of
donor organs, including public education and the use of less ,
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than perfect donors. However, one plentiful source heretofore
forbidden by law has been anencephalic infants. Anencephalic neonates face a certain and usually imminent death, and
since they la,c k the ability to·ever have consciousness) many
,parents hav~ sought to give some meaning to their personal
tragedy through organ donation.
The Council, after a two year study of the pros and cons ,
of the current law, changed its position to advocating the use
of anencephalic infants as organ donors. This change is based
on several factors, but primarily on a correct understanding of
. anencephaly. The anencephalic infant- lacks any cerebral
hemispheres; possessing only a brain stem, which is the site of
certain reflex actions such as breathing, sucking and spontaneous movements of the arms or legs. Because of this, they never
experience any degree of consciousness or have the ability' to
experience consciousness, and most die within days or weeks
. of their birth. '
. ln the past, law has required that persons be dead before
their organs are taken for someone else, thus assuring'that one
person's life cannot be taken for the benefit of a~other person.
The exception to thi~ rule"ofcourse, is the brain dead donor
whose' bodily function may be continuing.but whose brain has
ceased to function entirely. This law currently protects those
' who are in a, persistent vegetative state or who may have
impaired brain function due to a number of causes. These
individuals, howeve{ neurologically impaired they may be,
differ greatly from anencephalic infants. All of these either have some degree of cerebral function, had cerebral function
in the past, or have the potential to return to consciousness in
the future. •
'
.
The anencephalic infant, on the other hand, never had
and never can have consciousness, representing a distinct
difference compared to neurologically impaired individuals ~
' Moreover, anencephalic infants possess distinctdiagnostk '
. facial and skull characteristics which make the diagnosis nearly
impossibl'e to mistake. The AMA's recomm~ndation ofhay'ing
two experts make the diagnosis would further di'minish the
chances of a: misdiagnos'is.
Some 'ethicists argue that permitting. the use of anencephalic infants as donors would begin a slippery slope in
organ donation, in that, if the organs of a child who is destined
to die from anencephaly are used, then it is a short distance to
using the organs of a child or adult who is going to die from
other causes. In actual fact, however, there is a precipitous
chasm between these tWo acts, in thatthe anencephaliC'infant
represents a diagnostic and neurologically certain outcome,
whereas it cannot be assumed that others ~ho are neurologically impa'ired or in persistent vegetative states will always
(emain in these conditions.
Some ethicists, such as Alexander Capron, argue that
using ,"live" infant as an organ donor would heighten the
'public's distrust of the , organ transplantation system, and
rather than increasing the s'upply of donor organs, would
actually decrease it. This argument is patently fallacious in
that the lay public already has troubfe with,the conc~pt of brain
dead donors who appear lifelike in all respects, yet a "doctor"
has dedared that their brain no 10hger functions. This is in
,

a
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distinct contrast to the anencephalic infant who has no brain
and misses the part of the skull that contains the brain" so that
even the lay person can instantly see the absence of the brai
, and uhderstand the absence of any consciousness. In short, 1
would seem more likely for the lay public to accept taking
organs from infants who obviously have no brain than from
infants or adults who appear to have brains and be alive.
S0n:1e have argued that the impact of-organ donation from
anencephalic infants would be so low that the resultant emotional debate would not be worth the price. However, there are
five hundred to one thousand children dying every year in
-.need of organs, and an estimated one to two thousand live
births per year which are anenc.ephalic infants. If properly
managed, organs frDm anencephalic infants could go a long
. way toward meeting the current organ crisis. Moreover, if
organs from anencephalic humans could be used, this would
limit or severely restrict any consideration of using animals as
organ'donors, as has been proposed. Clearly, it is ethically far
more appropriate to use the organs of human infants who will
, die than' those of animals who would otherwise have gon;e on
living.
"
For many years, the courts in the- United States have
upheld the parents' right to terminate life support for their
anencephalic infants. The courts have also given ' parents 'Of
a,nencephalic infants the right to keep their infants alive if they '
so deem: Allowing p-arents of anencephalic infants to donate
their child's organs would, therefore, not make it imperative for
'the family to do so, but would allow them to make some sense
of their personal tragedy' by giving life to four or five othe
infants. This may prove to be the most important ethical and
moral' imperative regarding the use of these ' infants.
Allowing parents of ~mencephalic infants to contribute 'to
the sustaining of other human life makes moraL and ethical
sense fr<:>m a societal viewpoint. With the ten year survival rate
of infaht heart transplantation being approximately 70%, the
chance of an anencephalis infant's organs contributing to long
term -life for several others 'is not imaginary or experimental,
but very real indeed .•

Discrimination: continued from page 3
cianshave a special duty to keep prejudices in check because
their patients rely upon them not only for their general
health, but for theirvery lives. Thus~ the kinds of information
physicians obtain from the,ir patients, how long ' physicians
spend with .patients, and the kinds of treatment physician~
offer their patients are all affected by gender bias. Further,
women generally visit their doctors more often and more
regularly thando men. Sexual discrimination occurs in many
forms: an overview of several specIfic instances illustrates '
this reality:
Using coronary disease as a first example, it is crucial to
nOte that although almost as many women as men die of heart
disease each year, women are only. half as likely to receive
. state-of-the-art heart attack treatment. ' Specifically, studies,
indicate~ that 26% of men hospitalized for heart attacks 're-'
ceived "clot buster" drugs to restore blood flow to the heart, .
whereas only 14% of women hospitalized for heart attacks
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received those same drugs, Bothangiopiasty and clot busting
drugs have proven as safe for women as -for men and there is
'10 evidence that women stand to benefit ariy less from such '
leatments. These are v:ery sobering findings in,view of the
fact that coronary-artery disease is the number one killer of
women in the United States, killing more women than lung
cancer or breast ~ancer. .out of the approximate 520,000 fatal heart attacks that occur in the United States every year, 48%
occurin women: coronary-artery disease is an equal opportunity killer! '
, Similarly, a University of Washington study indicated
that men,are twice as likely as women ~to undergo angioplasty
and that.women are far less likely to receive'radiologicahests
for blocked vessels, including revascularization and ' coronary-artery bypass surgeryP According to a 1990 study at
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, men are more'
likely to be referred for surgery following abnormal cardiac
tests, whereas women ar~ not generally referred until they are
older and sicker than -their male counterparts. ,Similarly, at
the NIH, two major studies in 1991 indicated the ,existence
of a clear-c-u t "sex bias" 4gainst women in the diagnosis and
treatment of heart disease. These studies showed that doctors are much less likely to order sophisticated tests and
operations for women with heart disease' than for men, evep ,
when the women are experiencing more severe symptoms
,
than their male counterparts~24 .
Cardiac ~esearch studies are similarly flawed ~ A good· '
example of the male' oriented foc~s of treatment for heart
uacks being derived from research p{(rformed ~xdusively
on men includes the landmark aspirin study financed by the
NIH. Cond~cted by the National Heart, Lung & Blood
Institute in 1981 on 22,000 male physicians, this study found
that men who take one aspirin every 'other day low:er their
heart attack risk. ' Because women were not included in any
of the clinical research trial,S, physicians do not know ~hether
aspirin helps, harms, or has no effect: at all on women. -An
interesting note to these statistiCs is infor~ation produced by
the American Medical Association ("AMA"), which .found
that women are-more likely to die during bypass 'su,rgery or
when they 'have a heart attack, which the AMA views as
evi,d ence that women's cardiovascular disease is not diag-:nosed or treated early enough. The AMA's Counsel on E thi- ·
cal and Judicial Affairs also stated that half of women who
have heart attack s die within a year as compared to 31 %of
men. Not -surprisingly, ~h'e AMA's legal counsel concluded
that "at the root of gender disp'arities and treatment .. .is the
sense that m'e n are more valuable and contribute more to
society than women."25 Breast cancer provides a second
illustration of the disparities bet~een the medical care -re:"
ceived by men and women. ' In 197 1, the National Cancer Act
declared war ~gain_st maligninci~s . Why is it then, that the
" breast cancer death rate has increased slightly and prev~iJ ence '
has steadily climbed during the past 21/2 decades?
- An examination of federai res~arch spending indicates
,hat a number of factors converged to 'stymie progress against
breast cancer. T o b egin with, women's health research was
a low priority during this period of time. Second, women
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historically and routinely were excluded from general health
'studies. Third, cancer research focused on treatment rather
than prevention and 100ke9 at malignancies such-as leukemia
and Hodgkins', lymphoma rather than breast cancer. Fourth,
most promising breast cancer studies Were delayed or abandoned. Fifth, no major studies 011 the prevention of breast
cancer were approved until the 1980's, during which time the
first major prevention trial was abandoned bef()re it was
completed. Aban<ionment has been attributed in part to the
fact that officials qu~stioIied whether women could be trusted
to comply with dietary guidelines; Similarly, a second major
diet~based prevention trial proposed in 1983 got underway in
,
'
1993, a decade late.
" Some officials at the NIH have gone on record to say that
such s,etbacks -were isolated incidents. However, Dr.
Bernadine P; Healy, Director of the NIH in 1991, stated that
the Institute considered male subjects the norm for study andro~tinely excluded women from participation. Moreover,
the gender hias was so pervasive that re,searchers' didn't even
include females in some studies directly related to women's
health. In one _a necdote that would be amusing-if it were not
so sad, researchers at R?ckefeller University used only men
in a study of the effects .of diet on estrogen, which is linked
to breast can'cer. 26
A 'third example of gender bias in the treatment of patients is renal failure. It is unco~troverted that white men
receive a greatly disproportionate share of the nation's transplanted kidneys as 'c ompared with white women and blacks '
of bot~ sexes. Spe~ificaIJy, ~hite men ,are twice as likely to
receive a new kidney as blacks of either sex. White males are
a third more likely to receive a kidney as white women. This
d~sparity exists even when patients are from comparable
socio-economic groups. Similarly, women ages forty-six to
sixty undergoing dialys,is are only half as likely to get a kidfley
transplant as their male cpunterparts.

Encout~ging Sig~s in Health Care Reform .
,Despite these disturbing statistics, encouraging _signs-cto
exist' in the arena of medical testing of, and treatment for
' women. Through the Office of Research on Women's H~alth
(ORWH), the NIH is prodding fed erally funded health
, centers to inci~-de women in clinical trials for medications, to
commence work on diseases that afflict women only, and to
study whether maladies 'such as heart disease, AIDS and,
can~er af(ect women differently than they do men. 27 ,
, M.oreovet, -t he NIH's program entitled "Womens' Health
Initiative;" launc;hed in 1991, entails a five hundred million
dollar, ten year plan to study150,000 post-menopausal women
flpr/(f/r)
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to determine how diet, exercise, and hormone therapy might
prevent cardiovascular disease, cancer and oste9Porosi~. The
NIH also is screenil).g applicants who receive federal funding
to ensure that they include more women in their studies or ,
provide an acceptable rationale for not doing so. Additionally, the new NIH protocols require the-ir researchers to '
evaluate how drugs behave differently in men and women.
Similarly, the NIH is putting more dollars behind research on
AIDS in women. AIDS is spreading fasrer among women
than men, according to the Centers for Disease Control, but
until recently, most AIDS research was,conducted on young "
white .males. In. order to (edress the oversight, the ·NIH '
, increaseq by56% the research on AIDS in women ~s of fiscal
year 1993. ,
. The American Health Security Act that was proposed by
President Clinton reflected a new sense of awareness in
government'al circl,es that gender discrimination must be acknowledged, addressed and in tjme eradicated from the
medical community at large. Gender bias has a long history.
On certain anthropological and socio-economic levels, discrimination was justifiable in any cult~re at certain evolution, ary points in time. ' No longer is it justifiable in the United
States. What will it take to end to end gender discrimination?

6. See Williamsv. Sa~be,413 F.Supp654 [D. B.C. 1976],.rev'donother
grounds sub non., Williams v.Bell, 190 U.S. App.D.C. 343, 587
Fed.2d 1240 [D.C.Cir, 1978].
7. Lipsett, 864 Fed.2d at 897, citing to Millerv. Bank ofAmerica, 60u
Fed:2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979)[Title VII claim]; Barnesv. Cost/e, 183
U.S. App. D.C. 90, 561 Fed.2d 983 (D.C ~ Cir. 1977)[Title VII
claim].
'
,8. Lipsett, 864 Fed.2d at 897 (citations omitted).
9. MeritorSavings Bank, FSB v: Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67, L. Ed. 2d
49, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (Title VII Claim), ("Meritor'), quoting
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir 1971).
1O.Id.

1 L Id. at 87-9.8 Citing ii Rabidue (emphasis added).
, 12. Id. at 898.
13. Lipsett, 864 Fed.2d at 901.
14. Id.
15. Lipsett, 759FSupp 40,51 quoting Greff Schneider, "Sexua"l Harassment and Higher Eduction," 65 Texas Law Review 525, 534-

35 (1987).
16.Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71 .
17. Id. at 903.
18. See Time Magazine, Jul. 8, 1981 at p. 52.
19. Id. at p. 53.
20. Id. at p. 52:
21. See, e.g., Newsweek, Jan. 31, 1994 at p. 54.
22. See PR Newswire Association, Oct. 12, 1993.
23. See Los Angeles Times, J. Scott, "Fewer Women Get New Heart
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